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 The Case for Antitrust Enforcement
Jonathan B. Baker
T
he U.S. Supreme Court has awarded the antitrust statutes near-
constitutional status, describing them as the “Magna Carta of free enter-
prise” and “as important to the preservationof economic freedom and our
free enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental
personal freedoms” (United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 [1972]).
Although the passion in this rhetoric is rooted in the social and political concerns
of an earlier era, the statement still captures the central role of antitrust in
protecting consumers against anticompetitive conduct that raises prices, reduces
output, and hinders innovation and economic growth. Competition is a public
good, and society cannot expect the victims of anticompetitive conduct to protect
themselves.
This article provides evidence of the necessity and success of antitrust enforce-
ment. It begins with examples of socially bene￿cial antitrust challenges by the
federal antitrust agencies to price ￿xing and other forms of collusion; to mergers
that appear likely to harm competition; and to monopolists that use anticompeti-
tive exclusionary practices to obtain or maintain their market power. The article
then considers systematic empirical evidence on the value of antitrust derived from
informal experiments involving the behavior of U.S. ￿rms during periods without
effective antitrust enforcement and the behavior of ￿rms across different national
antitrust regimes. Overall, the bene￿ts of antitrust enforcement to consumers and
social welfare—particularly in deterring the harms from anticompetitive conduct
across the economy—seem likely to be far larger than what the government spends
on antitrust enforcement and ￿rms spend directly or indirectly on antitrust
compliance.
y Jonathan B. Baker is Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, American University,
Washington, D.C. From 1995 to 1998, he served as Director, Bureau of Economics, Federal
Trade Commission, Washington, D.C.
Journal of Economic Perspectives—Volume 17, Number 4—Fall 2003—Pages 27–50Much of the evidence cited here involves cases from recent decades, because
antitrust law underwent a revolution starting around a quarter-century ago, when
the courts began to replace legal rules predicated in part on advancing social and
political goals with rules focused on economic goals (Baker, 2002a; Kovacic and
Shapiro, 2000). In addition, antitrust practice increasingly relies on econometric
analyses (Baker and Rubinfeld, 1999). To be sure, some older decisions exemplify
useful antitrust interventions that would likely still come out the same way, and
modern game-theoretic analyses have rehabilitated some older antitrust theories
too quickly dismissed on the basis of price-theoretic arguments by the original
proponents of the economic approach. But on the whole, efforts to draw conclu-
sions about the ef￿cacy of current antitrust enforcement based on old Supreme
Court cases, as Crandall and Winston attempt in this journal, are similar to drawing
conclusions about the value of monetary policy by looking at the actions of the
Federal Reserve from its founding in 1913 through the Great Depression.
Collusion
The U.S. Department of Justice has recently undertaken a number of high-
pro￿le international cartel prosecutions in substantial markets like vitamins, lysine
(an additive to animal feed), graphite electrodes (large columns used to conduct
heat and melt scrap steel in electric arc furnaces employed by steel minimills) and
￿ne arts auctions. The well-known ￿rms involved in these conspiracies have paid
substantial ￿nes, including $500 million by Hoffman-La Roche, $100 million by
Archer Daniels Midland (ADM) and $45 million by Sotheby’s. Conspiring execu-
tives have been sentenced to jail, and many of the ￿rms have also agreed to pay
substantial damages to victimized buyers, with payments by the vitamins conspira-
tors to date reportedly amounting to more than $1 billion.
As one example, the lysine cartel was formed by ADM and several large Asian
rivals. Senior executives from the ￿rms met multiple times annually, sometimes
under the cover of a ￿ctitious trade association, to set prices, allocate sales volumes
and monitor compliance with the agreement (United States v. Andreas, 216 F.3d 645
[2000]; Eichenwald, 2000; Lieber, 2000). Meetings and telephone conversations
were recorded because an ADM executive cooperated with the FBI in an under-
cover operation to investigate the conspiracy. The videotaped record shows the
lysine conspirators nervously laughing at the thought of being observed by custom-
ers or law enforcers. As one senior ADM executive said: “The competitor is our
friend, and the customer is our enemy.” Between mid-1992 and mid-1995, accord-
ing to an estimate made by a plaintiffs’ expert, U.S. customers paid on average
17 percent above what an oligopoly might have charged absent the conspiracy, and
the overcharge to customers exceeded $75 million in the United States and
$200 million worldwide (Connor, 2001, p. 264).
The lysine investigation turned up a related conspiracy, also involving ADM, to
￿x the price of citric acid (a food additive) through similar means. Investigation of
that cartel led the U.S. Department of Justice to uncover a covert agreement by
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and Rhone-Poulenc (now part of Aventis) to ￿x the prices of vitamins during the
1990s. The vitamin cartel was so well organized that one of its participants referred
to it as “Vitamins, Inc.” Each year for nearly a decade, the global marketing heads
of the conspiring ￿rms, in concert with product managers and regional managers,
would conduct a “budget” meeting to set the overall sales volume for each vitamin,
allocate market shares and determine prices and price increases. Lower level
executives met quarterly with their counterparts at other ￿rms to ensure that the
cartel ran smoothly. One plaintiffs’ expert estimated that the overcharge to buyers
amounted to more than 25 percent of global sales revenues, conferring at least
$7 billion in monopoly pro￿ts over the course of the conspiracy and overcharging
purchasers in the United States alone by at least $1.2 billion (Connor, 2001,
pp. 334–336). The direct victims included food producers like General Mills,
Coca-Cola, Tyson Foods and Procter and Gamble; end-use consumers were also
victims, indirectly.
Other recent studies con￿rm that successful cartels can cause substantial harm
if not stopped by antitrust enforcement. Additional examples include a bid-rigging
scheme involving government procurement of frozen ￿sh, which raised price by
over 20 percent for four years (Froeb, Koyak and Werden, 1993); bid rigging in
sewer construction contracts (Howard and Kaserman, 1989); a conspiracy to de-
press the price of real estate sold at auction, which led to prices averaging
32.5 percent below the competitive level (Kwoka, 1997); and bid rigging involving
school milk procurement in multiple states, which raised price by 6.5 percent in
one market and likely more in other markets (Porter and Zona, 1999; Lanzillotti,
1996; Lee, 1999; Pesendorfer, 2000). Other examples are noted by Kwoka (2003)
and Werden (2003). Economic studies of cartel behavior have been the subject of
a recent survey by Levenstein and Suslow (2002), who study the determinants of
cartel effectiveness and duration.
Antitrust enforcers also address the cartel threat indirectly. Antitrust law
objects to agreementsto engage in practices that likelyfacilitate collusion or appear
to have led to higher prices, even without proof that the ￿rms agreed on price.
These may include, for example, agreements among rivals to exchange price and
output information, if doing so would facilitate the reaching of consensus on a
collusive price or help deter cheating by making price cutting transparent (United
States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333 [1969]). They may also include challenges to
mergers among competitors that appear likely to facilitate collusion, for example,
in a hospital merger challenge upheld in a decision by Judge Richard Posner
(Hospital Corporation of America v. Federal Trade Commission, 807 F.2d 1381 [1986]).
Antitrust law is concerned with the loss of competition on quality and inno-
vation as well as on output and price. Collusion to reduce expenditures on research
and development is rarely observed, as cheating may be hard to detect or punish.
However, the government obtained a consent decree in 1969 settling charges that
a 16-year agreement among the leading U.S. automobile manufacturers to share
information and intellectual property on ways to reduce emissions had suppressed
industry research and development into air pollution control equipment by
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1980; Wise, 1974). The challenged agreement was in force during an era in which
the Big Three automakers likely had only a limited incentive to innovate relative to
that of their fringe rivals(Baker, 1995).Relatedly,antitrust law is concerned if ￿rms
exploit a standard-setting agreement to exclude rivals in order to prevent improve-
ments in product quality, as in the case of Allied Tube & ConduitCorp. v. Indian Head,
Inc. (486 U.S. 492 [1988]).
Arguments that aggressive prosecution of cartels is unnecessary often empha-
size reasons why it may be dif￿cult for sellers to achieve or maintain coordination.
For example, buyers may try to create competition among sellers, or producers may
be tempted to cheat on their cartel arrangements. For such reasons, the coordina-
tion of a cartel, when effective at all, almost invariably falls short of joint-pro￿t
maximization (Green and Porter, 1984), and the cartel itself may crumble over
time. Unfortunately, these competitive pressures are insuf￿cient to prevent all
cartels. When sellers are few and buyers are many, as with the lysine and vitamins
cartels, collective buyer action to increase competition is highly implausible (Cala-
bresi, 1968). Moreover, ￿rms have shown great inventiveness in creating organiza-
tional mechanisms to assure coordination and enforcement (for example,
Genesove and Mullin, 2001).
1 As noted above, the lysine conspirators feigned
meetings of an industry association. In another celebrated conspiracy, General
Electric, Westinghouse and other sellers agreed during the late 1950s to rotate the
low bid for procurement of various electrical equipment among ￿rms according to
the phases of the moon (Fuller, 1962; Herling, 1962). Even if cartels might
eventually fail on their own, therefore, antitrust enforcement has an important role
to play in shortening their life expectancy.
Mergers
The U.S. economy experienced clusters of mergers around 1900, during the
late 1920s, during the late 1960s, during the 1980s and during the late 1990s
through 2000—generally periods of economic expansion and strong stock market
performance. Mergerstend to be concentrated in sectors buffetedby outside forces
such as deregulation, technological change, supply shocks like changing oil prices
and the end of the Cold War, leading ￿rms to alter business strategies and
recon￿gure assets (Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford, 2001). From 1998 through
1 Crandall and Winston in this journal offer the deregulated U.S. airline industry to illustrate the
dif￿culties ￿rms may face in coordinating. But this industry arguably instead shows how coordination
can succeed. Airlines are undoubtedly more competitive today than during the regulated era. Still,
during the 1990s, the deregulated airline industry was the subject of a Justice Department price-￿xing
complaint, which was settled by consent (United States v. Airline Tariff Publishing Co., 58 Fed. Reg. 15,225
[1994], 58 Fed. Reg. 3971 [1993]; see also Borenstein, 1999) and some industry conduct at the end of
that decade may best be described as coordinated,in the sense of re￿ecting the outcomeof an oligopoly
supergame among ￿rms in repeated play (Baker, 2002b, pp. 166–173), without necessarily violating the
antitrust prohibitions on agreements among rivals.
30 Journal of Economic Perspectives2000, more than 4,000 mergerswere reported annually for antitrust review, though
that number has more recently fallen to half its peak level.
Since 1976, ￿rms have been required to notify the antitrust authorities of all
mergers above a certain size. In reviewing proposed mergers, the U.S. antitrust
enforcement agencies rarely investigate intensively; they issue a “second request”
subpoena for additional information concerning fewer than 5 percent of reported
mergers in a typical year (Leary, 2002). An even smaller percentage of proposed
mergers are challenged in a way that leads to a court decision, consent decree
(typically allowing the merger to proceed subject to asset or product line divesti-
tures) or abandonment of the transaction.
In choosing the tiny proportion of merger cases in which they will intervene,
antitrust authorities these days largely emphasize horizontal mergers (acquisitions
among competitors) in relatively concentrated markets. In the soft drink industry,
the Federal Trade Commission has blocked Pepsi’s proposed acquisition of 7UP
and Coke’s merger with Dr Pepper (Federal Trade Commission v. Coca-Cola Co., 641 F.
Supp. 1128 [1986]). In 2001, the U.S. Department of Justice challenged General
Dynamics’ acquisition of Newport News Shipbuilding, the only other builder of
nuclear submarines for the U.S. Navy. In 1995, the Department of Justice stopped
Microsoft, the owner of Microsoft Money personal ￿nance software, from acquiring
Intuit, owner of the leading rival software product, Quicken. The two software
products together accounted for more than 90 percent of a marketinto which entry
appeared to be dif￿cult. In the defense procurement and software cases, the
merging ￿rms chose to abandon their proposed deals rather than to litigate.
In some cases, agency review focuses on protecting competition in the devel-
opment of new products. In reviewing the 1997 merger of the two ￿rms that
became Novartis, for example, the FTC concluded that the merger partners were
two of only a small number of entitiescapable of developing gene therapy products.
To preserve new product development in gene therapy, without hindering the
procompetitive aspects of the merger in other markets, the FTC reached a settle-
ment allowing the merger but requiring Novartis to license intellectual property
rights for gene therapy commercializationto Rhone-Poulenc (now part of Aventis),
which had the ability to develop but not commercialize such therapies, thus putting
another ￿rm in a position to compete against Novartis. Similarly, Fazio and Stern
(2000) describe Justice Department efforts to preserve innovation competition
through conditioning approval of a software merger on licensing of intellectual
property.
Evaluating the actions of antitrust authorities in merger cases is dif￿cult. In cartel
cases, a researchercan oftencompare industryperformancewith what occurredbefore
or after the alleged cartel. But in most cases, when a merger is blocked or a consent
settlement is negotiated, the originally proposed merger never happens, so a compar-
ison over time is not possible. One way to learn about the effects of mergersis to study
small mergers, which are not reportable in advance and so may not be reviewed or
challenged until after they occur. An FTC study of consummated soft drink bottling
mergersfound that acquisitions betweenhorizontal rivals(such as a local Coca-Cola or
Pepsi bottler acquiring rights to bottle Dr Pepper or 7UP from a third bottler serving
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12.8 percent for large ones (Saltzman, Levy and Hilke, 1999).
In the case of mergers that were proposed but did not take place, one way of
assessing the likely competitive effects is to look at disaggregated data on pricing
behavior in markets with different structures, where the markets may vary cross-
sectionally or over time. For example, in 1997, the Federal Trade Commission
successfully challenged a proposed merger between two of the three leading of￿ce
superstore chains, Staples and Of￿ce Depot. A detailed government analysis of
store-by-store pricing across cities and over time found that Staples’ prices for
consumable of￿ce supplies were higher where and when it faced no of￿ce super-
store chain rival and that in consequence the merger, had it been allowed to
proceed, would have generated an average price increase of about 7 to 8 percent
in cities where the merging ￿rms would otherwise have competed (Ashenfelter,
Baker, Ashmore and Hoskin, 2003;Baker, 1999;Dalkir and Warren-Boulton, 1999).
This conclusion was consistent with documentary evidence relied on by the court
(Federal Trade Commission v. Staples, Inc., 970 F.Supp. 1066 [1997]), which showed
that Staples’ prices were highest in geographic regions where it faced no compe-
tition from other of￿ce superstore chains and 13 percent lower in areas where
Staples competed with both of the other two of￿ce superstores. The documents also
showed that the merging ￿rms grouped metropolitan areas into price zones
according to the extent of of￿ce superstore competition in the region, almost
entirely without regard to rivalry from non-superstore retailers of of￿ce supplies
(such as Wal-Mart or Best Buy) and that Staples would reclassify a price zone to
lower price in response to entry by rival superstores, but not following entry by
other types of retailers.
Another common approach for estimating effects of mergers among sellers of
branded consumer products, where competition is often localized among brands with
similar characteristics and images, integrates estimates of the parameters of demand
alongwithinformationor assumptions about marginalcost and oligopolyconduct (the
Bertrand-Nash assumption is popular) to make inferences about postmerger equilib-
rium prices.For example,a simulation of a mergeramong leading bakers of white pan
bread, prepared by a Department of Justice expert before the government challenge
was settled by consent, predicted wholesale price increases as high as 10 percent for
some products in some cities (Werden, 2000). Simulations of hypothetical mergers
using market data similarlyindicate that in the absence of antitrust enforcement,some
mergers would generate higher prices (Baker and Bresnahan, 1985; Nevo, 2000;
Werden and Froeb, 1994). A study that evaluated the performance of merger simula-
tion found that it captured a substantial portion of the actual postmergerprice change
for six mid-1980sairlinemergers(Peters,2003).Pautler(2001)providesa broad survey
of empirical studies of mergers.
2
2 Crandall and Winston criticize government mergerenforcers by pointing out that their forecasts of the
effects of acquisitions may differ from the predictions of ￿nancial markets based on stock market event
studies. But forecasts by government enforcers should be preferred to those of the ￿nancial markets
because enforcement agency views incorporate more information than is available to investors, as
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Exclusionary conduct that harms competition can be attacked under the
antitrust laws as monopolization (or an attempt to monopolize) if it involves the
unilateral acts of dominant ￿rms. Such conduct may also be challenged if it takes
the form of an anticompetitive “horizontal” agreement among rivals or a “vertical”
agreement between ￿rms and their suppliers or customers.
The antitrust enforcement agencies pursue relativelyfew monopolization cases
at any given time—by one count (Kovacic, 1999, p. 1288, n. 23), only six were
initiated during the decade of the 1990s.
3 These cases are not necessarily more
expensive to investigate and prosecute than other antitrust cases; the mammoth
IBM case, dropped in 1982 after 700 trial days, was an aberration. When monop-
olization is proven by the government, “conduct relief” barring anticompetitive
practices is more common than “structural relief” of a divestiture or breakup and
also more common than a requirement that the monopolist license its key intel-
lectual property, although the latter possibilities make the headlines.
An example of conduct relief occurred in the FTC’s consent settlement
with drugmaker Bristol-Myers Squibb in 2003. Bristol was accused of illegally
maintaining its monopoly in markets for certain anticancer and antianxiety
drugs by blocking the entry of generic rivals through deceptive Food and Drug
Administration and Patent and Trademark Of￿ce regulatory ￿lings, baseless patent
infringementlawsuits and paying a prospective competitor not to enter. Consumers
were forced to overpay by hundreds of millions of dollars, according to the FTC.
The consent order bars Bristol from taking future advantage of the regulatory
processes it allegedly abused. Several states brought parallel enforcement actions
and obtained substantial monetary relief.
Perhaps the most prominent recent monopoly case in which the government
obtained structural relief is the consent settlement that resulted in the 1984 AT&T
divestiture (United States v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 552 F.Supp. 131
[1982]). The two main antitrust concerns involved the exercise of market power
governmentinvestigators are uniquelyable to reviewnonpublicmarketing documentsfrom the merging
￿rms and their rivals and to interview their customers. Moreover, the interpretation of event studies
themselves is contested (Pautler, 2001, pp. 14–15).
3 It is dif￿cult to understand what Crandall and Winston could hope to learn about antitrust enforce-
ment generally from the attention they pay to this limited aspect of federal activity, even if, as is
implausible, all the old monopolization cases they review would have been analyzed and remedied the
same way were they decidedtoday. Moreover,their interpretationscan be challenged. For example, they
treat the court remedy in the Justice Department’s monopolization lawsuit against Alcoa as a failure
(United States v. Aluminum Company of America, 148 F.2d 416 [1945]), on the ground that the competitive
problem was solved by the post–World War II sale of the aluminum plants constructed during the war
to Kaiser and Reynolds, creating new competitors for Alcoa. In fact, this outcome represents a
competition policy success. Alcoa exercised substantial market power before World War II (Suslow,
1986). The government’s success on appeal in the court case helped create the political climate that
prompted the sale of the surplus facilities to new entrants rather than to Alcoa (Balmer and Werden,
1981, p. 99; Kovacic, 1999, p. 1306; Roback, 1946), and the decline in Alcoa’s market share during the
1960s and 1970s, made possible by the previous government sponsorship of entry, led to lower prices
(Bresnahan and Suslow, 1989).
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664; Brennan, 1987). The Bell System maintained market power in unregulated
markets for specialized telephone service and customer premises equipment by
discriminating against those rivals when they sought to connect with Bell’s regu-
lated local telephone service monopoly. The Bell System also raised prices on
regulated services, and obtained a competitive advantage in unregulated markets
unrelated to production ef￿ciency, by persuading regulatory agencies, which had
dif￿culty understanding its costs, to attribute some costs of doing business in
unregulated markets to the regulated service. Under the settlement, the Bell
System was broken into multiple parts. Its successors include a company that
provides long distance service (the current AT&T), a number of local telephone
service providers sometimes termed the “Baby Bells” (what are now, after mergers,
BellSouth, Qwest, SBC and Verizon) and a ￿rm producing telephone equipment
(Lucent, createdby spinoff in 1996).The breakup of the AT&T monopoly has been
credited with contributing to reduced long distance phone rates, increased indus-
try productivity, spurred deployment of ￿ber optic lines and reduced prices of
terminal equipment and switches (for example, Crandall, 1991, pp. 412, 416–417;
Faulhaber, 2003, pp. 82–84; Noll and Owen, 1989).
4
The most conspicuous antimonopoly case of recent years involves Microsoft
(Bresnahan, 2002; Gilbert and Katz, 2001; Klein, 2001; Whinston, 2001). To date,
a unanimous en banc decision of a federal appeals court—which includes Judge
Douglas Ginsburg, a conservative antitrust expert who led the Antitrust Division of
the Department of Justice during the Reagan administration—has upheld the
district court’s conclusion that Microsoft acted illegallyto maintain its monopoly of
the operating systems market (United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d. 34 [2001]).
The key factual ￿ndings tell a compelling story of harm to competition. Microsoft’s
operating system monopoly was insulated against entry, most importantly because
many widely used applications programs for the personal computer—including
Microsoft’s own market-leading software products for word processing (Word) and
spreadsheets (Excel)—could not be used with an entrant’s rival operating system
(though these programs are available for Apple’s operating system). The develop-
ment of the Internet browser posed a threat to the Windows operating system
monopoly from the way that Netscape’s browser, combined with Sun’s Java pro-
gramming language, promised to make it possible for software developers to write
applications programs that would access any operating system through the browser,
thus allowing computer users to continue to work with their favorite applications
after switching operating systems. The courts found that Microsoft acted unfairly to
stop this nascent threat through exclusive contracts with leading Internet service
providers and manufacturers of new computers and through the integration of
browser and operating system software—all undertaken with no business purpose
4 In discussing the 1984 AT&T divestiture decree, Crandall and Winston accept that it has successfully
reduced long distance phone rates, but argue, oddly, that antitrust can claim no credit because another
government entity, the Federal Communications Commission, could have solved the competitive problem,
but did not do so. The kudos in their story should go to the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of
Justice, which acted to promote and protect competition, rather than to the industry regulator, which did not.
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to consumers from Microsoft’s Windows monopoly, in termsof higher prices or less
innovation, is dif￿cult to quantify. Moreover, the current government settlement
with Microsoft, if it turns out to be the ￿nal word, may later be found inadequate
to solve the competitive problems identi￿ed by the appellate court. But arguments
over quanti￿cation or the suf￿ciency of the settlement hardly add up to a demon-
stration that the Microsoft case should not have been brought.
Finally, monopolization cases are sometimes settled by licensing the intellec-
tual property necessary to permit rivals to compete. The FTC’s 1975 settlementwith
Xerox provides an example. Xerox had been charged with monopolizing the
market for of￿ce copiers, mainly through patent licensing practices and marketing
practices involving patented products. The case was settled through an agreement
requiring Xerox to license its patents for a small royalty, effectively removing most
of its patent protection. The settlement was highly successful. It opened up the
market to competition and innovation; wakened a sleepy monopolist to the need to
update its products, cut costs and better serve its customers; and led to substantial
improvements in product quality and large reductions in price (Bresnahan, 1985;
Tom, 2001). Applying modern antitrust standards to the 1974 facts, Xerox would
still be considered a monopolist, charging high prices and inhibiting the develop-
mentofnew products. Butthe case was brought under legaltheoriesabout theharmful
effects of obtaining and licensing patents that would generally not be accepted today
(Tom, 2001); government enforcers now would be forced to look further to ￿nd the
unlawful acts by which a similar monopoly could be challenged in court.
Antitrust law also objects to exclusionary agreements that allow ￿rms to exercise
market power by protecting them from competition (Krattenmaker and Salop, 1986).
As with collusion, market forces like buyer pressure may be insuf￿cient to prevent the
resultingharms (Rasmusen, Ramseyerand Wiley,1991).For example,the government
has challenged“most favored nations” clauses, also termed“most favored customer” or
“nondiscrimination” provisions, in a number of contracts between dominant health
plans (like the Blue Cross plan in many locations) and health care providers such as
doctors, hospitals, pharmacists or dentists (Baker, 1996). Under these contractual
provisions, health care providers agree not to accept lower reimbursement from rival
health plans than the reimbursement rate they receive from the dominant plan, their
most favored customer. Absent the “most favored customer” provision, entrants or
rivals might seek to lower their costs by making deals with participating doctors or
dentists to send the providers large numbers of patients in exchange for better prices,
and expectto attract those patients by charging the lowerpricesmade possible by their
lower costs. But most favored customer provisions can protect the dominant health
plan against this competitive threat by making it impractical for entrants and rivals to
make such procompetitive deals, allowing the dominant plan to maintain the price of
health insurance above the competitive level.
5
5 These provisions can also harm competitionthrough a second route, facilitating tacit collusionamong
providersby making discounting costly. And they can have ef￿ciency justi￿cations, though the best such
explanations—preventing opportunism when futures markets are unavailable or signaling low prices in
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Systematicempiricalevidenceoftheef￿cacy ofantitrustcomesfromfourinformal
experiments, analyzed in the economic literature, on the behavior of ￿rms during
historicalepisodesinwhichU.S. antitrust enforcementwas absent or lax.
6 In particular,
U.S. ￿rms were able to operate largely without fear of antitrust laws before the
enactment of the Sherman Act and for some years after and again during the 1930s,
whenthe antitrustlawswereeffectivelysuspended fora time.In addition,exportcartels
have been permitted for nearly a century, and airline mergers were subject to an
unusually permissive enforcement regime during part of the 1980s.
7
The ￿rst informal experiment examines industry performance in the United
States before 1890, when the ￿rst federal antitrust law, the Sherman Act, was
enacted, or in the ￿rst quarter century after 1890, when federal antitrust enforce-
ment was often ineffectual (though some ￿rms were subject to rate regulation or
state antitrust laws). Studies of major industries during the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries demonstrate successful though imperfect coordination in steel
(Scherer, 1996, chapter 6), bromine (Levenstein, 1996, 1997), railroads (Ellison,
1994; Porter, 1983; Hudson, 1890) and petroleum re￿ning (Granitz and Klein,
1996), for example. The anticompetitive activities of Standard Oil described by
Granitz and Klein (1996) also illustrate harmful exclusionary behavior,
8 as does
markets where buyer search is costly—are generally not persuasive in the health care settings where
government enforcement has been concentrated.
6 Crandall and Winston seek systematic evidence to evaluate merger policy from data on two-digit SIC
industries, using a regression with price-cost margins as the dependent variable and several measures of
the numberof mergerssubject to enforcementactions as keyindependentvariables.Their methodology
suffers from a numberof serious dif￿cultiesdiscussed in detail by Werden(2003) and Kwoka (2003) that
combineto make the results uninformative as to the effectiveness of antitrust enforcementactivity; I will
mention only a few of the problems here. Their empiricalstudy is not constructed to identify the effects
of antitrust enforcement agency merger policy: to interpret it as providing such, it is necessary to
suppose, implausibly, that ￿rms act as though there is no antitrust restriction on mergers until they see
federal enforcement in their own (but no other) market two years in the past and then are chastened,
but only for two years. The dependent variable, accounting price-cost margins, represents a poor proxy
for the economic concept of the price-cost margin because of well-known dif￿culties in inferring
marginal cost from accounting data (Fisher, 1987; Fisher and McGowan, 1983; Liebowitz, 1982). The
level of recent merger enforcement activity, the basis for the key independent variables, is treated as an
indicator of the severity of antitrust scrutiny. Yet the level of enforcementactivity in an industry may well
instead be related primarily to the level of industry merger activity, which, in turn, would be expected
to be affected substantially by a variety of factors unrelated to the strictness of antitrust policy such as
technological change and non-antitrust regulatory developments. Even if these measurement errors
were ignored, moreover, measurement at the highly aggregated two-digit SIC level makes it impossible
practically that any relationship could be detected in the data even if one might in principle be
observable at the level of antitrust markets, which are typically substantially more narrow than less
aggregated four-digit SIC codes (Pittman and Werden, 1990; Werden, 1988).
7 These informal experiments ignore the lesser variation in antitrust enforcement outside these ex-
tremely permissive periods. Empirical studies identifying market power in other periods are surveyed by
Bresnahan (1989) and, less technically, by Baker and Bresnahan (1992).
8 The Standard Oil case was one of the most controversial and in￿uential antitrust decisions in history.
The most persuasive modern analysis explains that Standard Oil harmed competition in multiple ways
(Granitz and Klein, 1996). In brief, Standard Oil had acquired virtually all the oil re￿neries in Cleveland
36 Journal of Economic PerspectivesAmerican Tobacco’s use of its reputation for low-cost pricing between 1891 and
1906 to force multiple rivals to agree to be acquired on terms favorable to the
dominant ￿rm (Burns, 1986). Other examples of anticompetitive mergers from
around 1900 are described by Lamoreaux (1985). This evidence plainly suggests that
in the absence of antitrust rules, anticompetitive conduct would often take place.
A second experiment identifying industry performance in the absence of the
U.S. antitrust laws took place during the 1930s, when Congress enacted the Na-
tional Industrial Recovery Act. This legislation, which was in force from mid-1933
to mid-1935, allowed industries to develop “Codes of Fair Competition,” in practice
free from antitrust prohibitions (Brand, 1988; Irons, 1982; Hawley, 1966; Lyon et
al., 1935). A number of industries used their codes as a vehicle for price-￿xing
through various methods: setting minimum prices, prohibiting sales below average
cost, prohibiting capacity expansion or outlawing secret or selective price-cutting.
Moreover,at about the same time as the passage of the National Industrial Recovery
Act, the U.S. Supreme Court held that under the emergency conditions of the
Great Depression, a large group of distressed coal producers could form an
exclusive, joint selling agent—effectively, a cartel—notwithstanding the antitrust
laws (Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 [1933]). The Court did
not repudiate this lax attitude toward price ￿xing until 1940 (United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 [1940]). Studies of industrial behavior during
the 1930s suggest that ￿rms in a number of industries were able to exploit the
opportunity to collude to learn ways of coordination that persisted for years after
the statute was declared unconstitutional (Alexander, 1994), including brewers
(McGahan, 1995) and steel producers (Baker, 1989).
9 But other attempts at
collusion were unsuccessful (Alexander, 1997).
Since 1918, the United States has effectivelyrepealed the antitrust laws as they
by 1872, then used its control of one-quarter of U.S. re￿ning capacity to become the “cartel manager”
for the three railroads that transported petroleum (shifting its oil shipments to punish cheating
railroads). It appropriated a share of the resulting rents by negotiating secret low rates for its shipments
(in the form of rebates) and penalties if the railroad increased shipments by rival re￿ners. Standard Oil
thus gained a cost advantage over rival re￿ners, allowing it to acquire them inexpensively. By 1879,
Standard Oil controlled more than 90 percent of U.S. re￿ning capacity. During the 1880s, Standard Oil
gained leverage on the railroads both by building pipelines that gave it an alternative to rail transpor-
tation and by controlling a large share of both petroleum shipments and the railroad cars used to carry
oil products. It exploited this leverage to prevent entry of new re￿neries. The Standard Oil monopoly
was not entirely harmful, because the ￿rm obtained cost reductions in re￿ning and transportation by
operating at scale and improvedthe management of re￿neries it acquiredfrom rivals, but any ef￿ciency
bene￿ts were likely dominated by the harm resulting from market power. A modern court would
probably not choose the remedy adopted in 1911: that is, breaking up the ￿rm mainly along regional
lines without ensuring separate ownership of the component parts or vigorous competition among
them.
9 Crandall and Winston recognize the potential value of the 1930s experience as an experiment
identifying the consequences of the antitrust laws, but their highly selective discussion refers only to a
study by Bittlingmayer (1995). Bittlingmayer suggests that the enactment of NIRA was responsible for an
observed rebound in aggregate industrial production, consistent with his view that collusion generally
expanded industry output by permitting ￿rms to solve widespread “empty core” problems that make
perfect competition infeasible in many industries. But Bittlingmayer’s empirical evidence is unconvinc-
ing, and his skepticism about whether competition can succeed in modern industry is idiosyncratic.
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the absence of antitrust constraints. A study of 111 cartel episodes covering 93
industries during the years 1918 to 1965 found many examples of long-lived export
agreements motivated by price-￿xing, as well as examples of cartels undermined by
price wars and fringe competition (Dick, 1996). One-quarter of the cartels survived
for at least 15 years. This evidence, too, suggests that absent antitrust enforcement,
many industries would ￿nd ways of coordinating to the detriment of consumers and
economic welfare.
A fourth experiment with relaxed antitrust enforcement involves a period
during which the antitrust authorities wanted to prevent certain mergers, but the
transactions were nevertheless permitted. This situation occurred during the mid-
1980s, when the Department of Transportation was charged with the review of
airline mergers, and allowed two large acquisitions involving carriers with substan-
tially overlapping route networks (Northwest’s acquisition of Republic and TWA’s
purchase of Ozark) to proceed over the opposition of the antitrust enforcers in the
Justice Department. The Justice Department’s opposition to these transactions is a
particularly strong signal of their competitive problems, because federal antitrust
enforcement was relatively relaxed during the second term of the Reagan admin-
istration (Fox and Pitofsky, 1992; but see Kovacic, 2003, for a different view).
Retrospective studies of these mergers have found higher fares in some markets,
with estimated average price increases generally at least 5–10 percent in city pairs
where the two carriers had previously competed (Peters, 2003, and the references
cited there). There is also evidence of a reduction in ￿ight frequencies, which can
be considered a reduced quality of service, between the same pairs of cities. Some
of these studies suggest that fares fell in city pairs where the merging ￿rms had not
previously competed, but these are markets where antitrust enforcers would likely
not have identi￿ed competitive problems. (To address such situations, the Justice
Department has recently allowed some competing airlines to form code-sharing
alliances that effectivelypermit them to combine route networks where they do not
compete while prohibiting code sharing on city pairs where they are head-to-head
rivals.)
In sum, studies of ￿rm behavior during these four periods demonstrate that
without antitrust, ￿rms can and do exercise market power, to the detriment of
consumers and other buyers. Not every ￿rm or industry performs anticompetitively
absent antitrust enforcement—competition is often a dominant strategy for sellers
independent of legal mandates (Stigler, 1964)—but many do, and when this
market failure occurs, the harm to competition can be substantial and long lasting.
Cross-National Comparisons
Most developed and many developing countries have competition policies
today, with enforcement in many jurisdictions, such as Canada and the European
Union, now roughly comparable to enforcement practices in the United States. But
that situation has only arisen during the last couple of decades. Since 1980, the
38 Journal of Economic Perspectivesnumber of nations with antitrust enforcement has increased from about 17 to
perhaps 100, and some nations with long-standing competition policies on the
books were in the past less serious about enforcement than was the United States.
For example, while the United States experimented with “crisis cartels” or “depres-
sion cartels,” which permit collusion by hard-pressed industries during severe
economic downturns, for a short time during the 1930s, the practice was historically
more accepted in Europe and Japan. Accordingly, cross-national comparisons,
particularly historical examples, provide another source of evidence on the ef￿cacy
of antitrust and the value of protecting competition.
At a broad level, economists seeking to understand why some nations have
grown wealthy consistently ￿nd that impediments to competition—which are fre-
quently imposed at the behest of private interests with a stake in protecting existing
economic and social arrangements—impede innovation, growth and prosperity
(Baumol, 2002; Easterly, 2001, chapter 9; Mokyr, 2002, chapter 6; Olson, 1982;
Parente and Prescott, 2000; Rosenberg and Birdzell, 1986; Shleifer and Vishny,
1998).
10 For example, Parente and Prescott use calibrated growth models to
investigate cross-national differences in income and productivity and conclude that
they arise importantly from the protected monopoly rights of groups of factor
suppliers. Similarly, studies by business consultants suggest that differences in the
power of competition across developed countries, which appear to be correlated
with the consistency and effectiveness of antitrust enforcement, have been an
important factor explaining differences in the performance of major industries
across economies (Porter, 1990, pp. 117–124; Baily, 1993; Baily and Gernsbach,
1995). A comparison of the tobacco industries in the United States and United
Kingdom around the start of the twentieth century, exploiting cross-national dif-
ferences in the timing of monopolization of tobacco manufacturing, also indicates
that technological innovation was more rapid during competitive periods (Zitze-
witz, 2003).
There are also several surveys of international cartels, typically involving peri-
ods or countries without antitrust laws or without strict enforcement. A detailed
survey of cartel episodes in 45 international manufacturing and commodity indus-
tries during the 1920s and 1930s found many examples of successful collusion
(Suslow, 1991). The median duration for noncensored observations in the sample
was about three years, and a number of cartels lasted at least a decade. Grif￿n
(1989) found a similar pattern in his sample of 54 cartels. Based on these studies,
three other cross-section studies of international cartels, and nearly 40 case studies
of domestic and international cartels involving 16 industries, Levensteinand Suslow
(2002) document the success that ￿rms in some (but not all) industries have in and
10 There is some dispute around the edges as to whether protecting competition is always bene￿cial,
mostly revolving around “second-best” problems in an economywith multiple distortions, particularly in
the context of promoting innovation (Gavil, Kovacic and Baker, 2002; pp. 1090–1097; Cabral, 2000,
pp. 292–302). These include the possibility of excessive R&D expenditures in a patent race or the
possibility that a prior monopoly may protect incentives for innovation by assuring greater appropri-
ability of the resulting rents when intellectual property protections are weak. Still, there is undoubtedly
widespread consensus that the exercise of market power is harmful.
The Case for Antitrust Enforcement 39coordinating their price and output decisions absent antitrust enforcement and
catalogue the factors that affect cartel duration. Symeonidis (2002) analyzes an
informal experiment in the introduction of antitrust rules from the United King-
dom during the late 1950s: a unique combination of legislativeand judicial acts that
led a number of industries ￿rst to register explicitprice-￿xing agreements and later
to abolish them. He ￿nds that price competition generally intensi￿ed, though is
mainly interested in showing that market concentration commonly increased as a
result (consistent with the view that prior cartel pricing had induced excessive
entry).
Deterrence
As with legal rules generally, from tort law to tax policy, the antitrust laws
create incentives that shape the behavior of all ￿rms, including those never found
in violation. The most dif￿cult part of quantifying the bene￿ts of antitrust enforce-
ment is that the primary bene￿ts may come from the deterrence of anticompetitive
conduct, which is then never observed. If one were studying the effects of speed
limits on driving speeds, it would be peculiar to consider only whether drivers who
were given tickets on one day drove more slowly the next—ignoring the impact of
speed limit enforcement generally on the vast majority of drivers who are not
ticketed. Similarly,many managers may never personally be involved in an antitrust
case, but they hear about others who are, and they learn about the rules through
guidance provided by their ￿rm’s antitrust counsel. Threat of antitrust enforce-
ment may deter anticompetitive actions in all markets, not just those where anti-
trust prosecutions occur. Estimating the size of this deterrent effect is dif￿cult, but
there is surely a severe downward bias to any estimate of the bene￿ts of antitrust
enforcement based solely on those cases that are prosecuted or the consent decrees
that are adopted. The deterrent effects of the antitrust laws may be particularly
important for protecting competition in markets where technology may change
more rapidly than antitrust can act—both in preventing today’s violators from
harming competition again in new markets and in deterringtomorrow’s ￿rms from
engaging in antitcompetitive acts in other high-technology industries.
The issue of deterrence complicates any interpretation of antitrust enforce-
ment based on individual case studies, which are inherently double-edged. If
antitrust enforcers uncover and prosecute a cartel engaged in price ￿xing, bid
rigging or market allocation, does that suggest that antitrust is a success for
stopping future harm or a failure for not deterring cartel formation? Both possi-
bilities are presumably to some extent true: with rising marginal costs of antitrust
enforcement, any enforcement regime subject to a budget constraint would be
expected to deter the cartels that would otherwise be easy to detect and prosecute,
but not to deter collusion altogether.
The deterrent effects of any antitrust enforcement scheme depend upon the
expected probability of detection and conviction and the magnitude of the penalty.
Yet penalties vary, from monetary penalties to jail time for executives, depending
40 Journal of Economic Perspectiveson the type of violation. Moreover, anticompetitive conduct may be challenged by
multiple national jurisdictions and, within the United States, by federal and state
enforcers as well as private parties. The deterrent effect of private enforcement in
particular is hard to assess because the treble damages remedy in force today differs
in many respects from the theoretical ef￿cient remedy. Some of these differences
suggest that the private damages remedy is too high, others suggest it is too low, and
still others suggest it is not set at the ef￿cient level in any particular case, but is
not clearly too high or too low on average (Gavil, Kovacic and Baker, 2002,
pp. 1040–1046).
Notwithstanding these dif￿culties, it seems unlikely that the current levels of
antitrust enforcement activity and penalties are generally so high as to lead to
overdeterrence. There is no serious evidence, for example, that legitimate coop-
erative behavior among industry rivals—standard setting, joint research and devel-
opment projects, public policy advocacy, trade association activities and the like—is
being deterred today for fear that antitrust enforcers would improperly chal-
lenge it. Nor do the handful of federal monopolization cases, or the tiny frac-
tion of proposed mergers that are challenged, appear likely to chill ef￿cient,
procompetitive conduct by market leaders or merging parties. For example, a
substantial fraction of acquisitions turn out not to be successful in obtaining the
projected ef￿ciency bene￿ts (Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987; Paulter, 2001,
pp. 18–22), suggesting that antitrust enforcement raises only a limited risk of
erroneously blocking procompetitive deals.
It is also hard to make out a case that antitrust rules chill innovation.
11 The
antitrust enforcement agencies and courts have recognized for decades that nearly
all product improvements and research and development collaborations are pro-
competitive, that so-called patent “monopolies” do not necessarily confer market
power given the way patented products often compete with each other and that
many ￿rms with large market shares have strong innovation records. On the whole,
antitrust enforcement in the high-technology sector has been both measured and
infrequent relative to the scope of high-tech markets.
Public choice theorists have emphasized the possibility that antitrust enforce-
ment does not always serve the public interest in deterring anticompetitive conduct
on the view that antitrust, like other forms of regulation, may be captured by private
interests (McChesney, 1991). However, as the example involving the U.S. Depart-
ment of Transportation review of airline mergers illustrates, the capture theory
11 Although the intellectual property and antitrust laws appear at odds from one perspective—one
creates monopolies while the other attacks them—they are better understood as providing largely
complementary approaches for promoting innovation. The intellectual property laws create property
rights that provide incentives to invest in R&D through assuring substantial appropriability of the
rewards to success, and the antitrust laws ensure that ￿rms do not misuse their property (whether plants
and equipment or patents and copyrights) to harm competition and consumers. From the pure
perspective of innovation incentives, ignoring the consumer bene￿ts of price competition, antitrust can
be thought of as analogous to restrictions on patent scope: both place limits on the intellectual property
reward system to protect the incentives for successive innovation that build upon an initial success.
Merges and Nelson (1994) make the argument with respect to patent scope.
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experience with the federal enforcement agencies, which review business practices
across the economy and do not specialize in any one industry. Moreover, modern
antitrust law discourages complaints by rent-seeking rivals through the “antitrust
injury” doctrine introduced in 1977,which requires that plaintiffs be harmed by the
anticompetitive aspects of the conduct about which they are complaining (Bruns-
wick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 [1977]).
Costs and Bene￿ ts of Antitrust Enforcement
Competition does not invariably happen by itself. The above examples of
anticompetitiveconduct successfully challenged by antitrust enforcers, which could
be added to many times over,
12 along with the more systematic empirical evidence
showing that ￿rms have often exercised market power during periods of relaxed
antitrust enforcement and the evidence of the bene￿ts of competition policy from
cross-national comparisons, together demonstrate that markets are not necessarily
quickly self-correcting and the harm from the exercise of market power can be
substantial. This evidence is based on a wide range of studies employing a variety of
methodological approaches.
Do the bene￿ts of antitrust enforcement exceed the costs? Almost surely,
although any quantitative calculus is highly speculative. On the cost side, some
components can be estimated. The direct governmental cost of antitrust enforce-
ment in the United States (mostly outlays for federal enforcement) is roughly
$150 millionper year. Directprivate costs include ￿rm expendituresassociated with
responding to government investigations and lawsuits and the costs of private
litigation. The costs to ￿rms of dealing with the government can be approximated
based on the private costs of merger review during the most recent merger wave,
when agency resources were heavily focused on this activity. (Private expenditures
associated with other government antitrust activity during this time period, mainly
cartel enforcement, are likely small by comparison.) The roughly 200 transactions
then receiving a second request each year—the transactions that account for the
great bulk of private costs—generated ￿rm expenditures on ￿ling fees, lawyers and
economic consultants averaging perhaps $2.5 millionper case (Global Competition
Review, 2003), for a total of $500 million annually. The comparable ￿gure for the
direct costs of private litigation, taken from Salop and White (1986, p. 1016) and
adjusted for in￿ation, is less than $400 million per year.
13 Thus, the total direct
12 Information about other federal government cases, from case ￿lings, press releases, speeches by
senior of￿cials and agency annual reports, can be found at ^http://www.usdoj.gov/atr& and ^http://
www.ftc.gov&. It can be challenging at times to distinguish betweenprocompetitiveand harmful conduct,
so not every case questioned by government enforcers or proven in court is as convincing a success as
those highlighted here. For an example of a more controversial recent appellate decision halting a
merger, see Baker (2003).
13 This ￿gure is less than the corresponding estimate for government enforcement, even though there
are many more private cases, because most private cases cost less than the typical second request. For
42 Journal of Economic Perspectivescosts for the government and private parties are approximately $1 billion annually.
This estimate omits indirect costs: the opportunity cost of management time
devoted to antitrust compliance and litigation, and any lost ef￿ciencies if bene￿cial
activities are deterredby the prospect of antitrust enforcement. My suspicion is that
these indirect costs, while possibly substantial, do not exceed the direct costs. If so,
the total annual costs of antitrust enforcement in the United States are no more
than $2 billion each year.
The bene￿ts of antitrust appear to be much greater. If one looks only at the
cases mentioned in this article—the collusion and price-￿xing prosecutions, the
monopoly and exclusion cases and the blocking of anticompetitive mergers—the
overall bene￿ts to U.S. consumers in remedying past overcharges and preventing
future losses are substantial. By one extremely rough approximation, the dead-
weight ef￿ciency loss from the vitamins cartel might amount to $50 million to
$100 million per year in the United States.
14 If so, every year by which the life
expectancy of this one cartel was shortened through successful antitrust enforce-
ment justi￿ed a substantial fraction—perhaps one-third to two-thirds—of the
$150 million direct costs of antitrust enforcement against all anticompetitive car-
tels, mergers, monopolies and practices. Of course, this estimate leaves out the
bene￿ts from deterring additional harmful conduct, not just in vitamin markets or
by the same ￿rms in other markets, but by all ￿rms throughout the economy.
A number of economists, beginning with Harberger (1954), have sought to
estimate the economy-wide welfare loss from the exercise of market power. These
estimates are made in the shadow of antitrust, so they suggest the magnitude of the
potential gains from additional antitrust enforcement, not the bene￿ts of current
enforcement activity in deterring the exercise of market power. Harberger sug-
gested that the deadweight loss triangle that results from an exercise of market
power leading to a small increase in price above marginal cost may be small,
because the area of the deadweight loss triangle (1/2 (DP) (DQ)) is the product of
two small numbers, the changes in the levels of price and output. In Harberger’s
calculation using data from the 1920s, the welfare loss was only 0.1 percent of
national product. But the Harberger methodology for calculation of the dead-
weight loss of market power substantially understates the magnitude of undeterred
market power for a number of reasons (Ferguson and Ferguson, 1994, pp. 88–95;
Viscusi, Vernon and Harrington, 2000, pp. 86–88), only some of which are noted
here.
example, the median number of depositions noticed in a sample of terminated cases was zero (Salop
and White, 1986, p. 1009).
14 To a ￿rst order, the deadweight loss of a small exercise of market power in oligopoly (as from a
collusive increase in price) is proportional to the aggregate amount that sellers overcharge buyers. The
proportion is related to the markup of price over marginal cost that would have obtained through
oligopoly conduct but for the anticompetitive practices, and to the elasticity of market demand. (A
similar approximation for representing the welfare consequences of merger is employed by Willig,
1991.) A rough estimate using this approximation, based on conjectures and estimates reported by
Connor (2001), suggests a welfare loss in the range of $50 million to $100 million per year. A short
appendix giving the calculations is available on request from this author.
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tries. Using a similar method that does not assume unitary demand, Cowling and
Mueller (1978) ￿nd that the deadweight loss estimate for the United States based
on data from the 1960s rises to 4 percent of national product. Using a different
method on industry data, Masson and Shaanan (1984) ￿nd deadweight losses of
about 3 percent.
Second, the Harberger framework ignores the lost consumer surplus from
overcharging buyers. Antitrust enforcers commonly evaluate ￿rm conduct by its
harm to consumers and by measures of lost consumer surplus, rather than its cost
to aggregate welfare or lost aggregate surplus, on distributional equity grounds
(Lande, 1992, 1989). The loss of the consumer surplus rectangle, which may be
considerably larger than the deadweight loss triangle, could also be relevant to an
ef￿ciency calculus. It may, to at least some extent, represent an otherwise un-
counted ef￿ciency loss because economic welfare is ultimately concerned with
consumption, and when ￿rms exercising market power transfer some consumer
surplus to producer surplus, the incremental ￿rm pro￿ts may or may not eventually
lead to an equivalent increase in consumer bene￿ts. (Roberts and Salop, 1996,
make a related argument.) In addition, the transfer of resources from buyers to
sellers, which does not initially represent a loss in aggregate surplus, could become
such a welfare loss if it is dissipated through wasteful rent-seeking activities (Posner,
1975; Tullock, 1967; Williamson, 1967). These may include, for example, expen-
ditures made on lobbying regulators to prevent entry, expenditures made on
instruments of strategic entry deterrence (Salop, 1979), or the costs of hiding
cartels from regulatory scrutiny. When Cowling and Mueller (1978, 1981) expand
the de￿nition of ef￿ciency loss in the Harberger approach to include some rent-
seeking expenditures, notably on advertising (under the polar assumption that
such expenditures operate as a strategic method for entry deterrence without
providing valuable information to buyers), they ￿nd a deadweight loss from im-
perfect competition as high as 13 percent of national product.
15
Finally, the deadweight loss calculations in the Harberger framework are static
in nature, ignoring the social costs that arise when anticompetitivepractices reduce
the incentivesfor innovation in an economy. Giventhe importance of new products
to economic welfare, these costs could be substantial.
These estimates of deadweight loss or changes in consumer surplus must be
treated with some skepticism because they rely importantly on accounting data on
margins or pro￿ts, which may not map closely to the relevant economic concepts.
15 Another disputable assumption in the Harberger framework is that the competitive price is marginal
cost. That assumption will be appropriate for many industries. But in high ￿xed cost, low marginal cost
industries, perhapsincluding airlines,pharmaceuticalsor software, some transactions may occur at price
levels in excess of incumbent seller marginal cost (as through price discrimination) even if entry is free,
as across-the-board marginal cost pricing may not permit ￿rms to cover their ￿xed investments
(Borenstein, 1985; Holmes, 1989; Spulber, 1989, pp. 544–548; Stole, 1995). If the competitive price
exceeds incumbent marginal cost, the deadweight loss includes a rectangle ((P-C) (DQ)) as well as a
triangle and is no longer second order relative to the transfer rectangle (Jackson, 1970).
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16 But if the Harberger approach is taken seriously, once
demand elasticities are allowed to vary by industry, and the ef￿ciency losses related
to consumer surplus rectangles or rent seeking plus concerns over foregone
innovation are ￿gured into the picture, the costs to the economy from the exercise
of market power could readily be at least 1 percent of national product, or in excess
of $100 billion annually, notwithstanding the antitrust laws. No practical antitrust
policy could be expected to prevent every last welfare loss from the exercise of
market power, and courts and agencies surely do not get every case correct. Still,
the substantial estimated magnitude of this welfare loss suggests the importance of
protecting competition through active enforcement of the antitrust laws.
This minimum estimate of the potential gains from additional antitrust en-
forcement provides a benchmark for assessing the bene￿ts of current enforcement
activity, under the plausible assumption that the ef￿ciency gains achieved by
preventing anticompetitive conduct—the deterrence bene￿ts of antitrust—are at
least as large as the potential gains from additional enforcement, which the
Harberger frameworkmeasures. This assumption is made plausible by the results of
the four informal experiments with permissive antitrust enforcement regimes
analyzed above, which indicate that much anticompetitive conduct would emerge
absent antitrust, and by the cross-national comparisons, which suggest that the
removal of impediments to competition can create national bene￿ts of a magni-
tude observable in macroeconomic aggregates. The assumption also makes sense
from a microeconomic perspective. After a successful attack on the vitamins price-
￿xing conspiracy, for example, it is unlikely that the conspiring ￿rms themselves
would reform their cartel or create another in other products for at least as long as
the vitamins cartel had been effective(if they ever collude again at all); unlikelythat
any cartel that nevertheless did form would be as effective as the previous one
(because the ￿rms would likely take expensive precautions to avoid detection a
second time); and likely that ￿rms in many other markets would be led to think
twice before forming or continuing a cartel of their own. Accordingly, the annual
welfare bene￿ts from deterring the exercise of market power through the anti-
trust laws as they are enforced today could readily exceed 1 percent of GDP, or
$100 billion per year. Bene￿ts from antitrust enforcement of this magnitude dwarf
any plausible estimate of the costs of antitrust enforcement.
Conclusion
The evidence is not available to determine with precision how robust antitrust
enforcement should be, and more research toward creating a systematic picture of
16 Forces like foreign competition, deregulation and innovation have made some industries more
competitive than they were in the past, as Crandall and Winston note. But increased competition in
some industries does not justify refraining from antitrust enforcement in the many other industries
where competition does not work well or would be harmed by ￿rm conduct. Moreover, entry may often
be limited as a force for competition (Geroski, 1995, p. 437).
Jonathan B. Baker 45the costs and bene￿ts of antitrust enforcement would be useful. But plainly, the
presumption should be in favor of antitrust enforcement as it is conducted today,
with substantial input from economists at the antitrust agencies and in the courts
both in resolving individual cases and in the development of antitrust rules. Given
the size of the potential losses in economic welfare and to consumers from the
exerciseof market power, the success of antitrust enforcementas exhibited in many
cases, the frequency, magnitude and length of competition problems that appear
during periods of relaxed enforcement, and the importance of competition in
promoting economic growth, innovation and prosperity, retreating to a minimalist
antitrust policy makes no sense. Instead, the goal should be to apply sensibly, and
sharpen as necessary, the tools of antitrust enforcement.
y The author is indebted to Timothy Brennan, Steven Brenner, Timothy Bresnahan, Andrew
Dick, John Graubert, John Hilke, Alvin Klevorick, John Kwoka, Robert Levinson, James May,
JonathanRich, Steven Salop, Marius Schwartz, Valerie Suslow, Gregory Werden, participants
in the Stanford Law and Economics Seminar, and the editors, and to Aaron B. Hewitt and
M. Elizabeth O’Neill for research assistance.
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